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Abstract:
In recent years, there has been growing interest in a range of transport policy
initiatives which are designed to influence people’s travel behaviour away from
single-occupancy car use and towards more benign and efficient options, through a
combination of marketing, information, incentives and tailored new services. In
transport policy discussions, these are now widely described as ‘soft’ factor
interventions or ‘smarter choice’ measures or ‘mobility management’ tools. In 2004,
the UK Department for Transport commissioned a major study to examine whether
large scale programmes of these measures could potentially deliver substantial cuts
in car use. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the approach taken in the study, the
types of evidence reviewed and the overall conclusions reached. In summary, the
results suggested that, within approximately 10 years, smarter choice measures have
the potential to reduce national traffic levels by about 11%, with reductions of up to
21% in peak period urban traffic. Moreover, they represent relatively good value for
money, with schemes potentially generating benefit: cost ratios which are in excess
of 10:1. The central conclusion of the study was that such measures could play a
very significant role in addressing traffic, given the right support and policy context.
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Introduction
Growing levels of traffic, together with their associated congestion and pollution, are
a cause for concern throughout the world. It is no longer thought possible to ‘build our
way out of trouble’ through road construction, and this has led to increasing interest
in a range of alternative ways to manage traffic levels. In particular, in recent years,
there has been growing interest in a range of transport policy initiatives which
combine marketing, information, incentives and, in some cases, tailored new services,
in order to influence people’s travel behaviour away from single-occupancy car use
and towards more benign or efficient ways of travelling. In transport policy
discussions, these are now widely described as ‘soft’ factor interventions or ‘smarter
choice’ measures or ‘mobility management’ tools.
In 2004, the UK Department for Transport commissioned a team of 6 specialists, co-
ordinated by the ESRC Transport Studies Unit at University College London and the
independent consultancy Transport for Quality of Life, to undertake a major study into
the potential of ‘soft’ or ‘smarter choice’ measures to reduce traffic levels in the UK in
the next 10 years
1. The central question that the study aimed to address was – could
large scale programmes of smart measures potentially deliver substantial cuts in car
use, or is their impact only likely to be marginal?
This is a particularly dynamic field of transport policy, in which many new schemes
and initiatives are being developed on an ongoing basis. To the authors’ knowledge,
the work reported here remains the most systematic and comprehensive overview of
the potential of these types of measures. The main report of the study (Cairns et al,
2004) runs to nearly 400 pages, with a supporting 300 page case study volume
(Anable et al, 2004), and it is not possible to reproduce the detail from the study
about individual measures in this paper. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to
clarify the approach taken in the study, the types of evidence reviewed and the
overall conclusions reached.
Specifically, this paper begins by describing the type of measures studied and the
study methodology, followed by a brief summary of previous literature. The next part
of the paper takes one of the soft measures studied – workplace travel plans – to
illustrate the type of evidence and analysis used to draw conclusions about how
significant such activities could be, and how much they typically cost. The findings
about all the measures studied, as derived from equivalent analysis, are then briefly
reported. Next, the paper provides more detail about the overall cost impact ratios
calculated, and the process used for calculating the overall impacts on traffic that a
package of such measures could achieve. Finally, some broader contextual issues
are considered.
Overview of the study approach
The terms ‘soft’ or ‘smarter choice’ measure are used to cover a range of initiatives.
The word ‘soft’ was originally used to distinguish them from ‘hard’ measures such as
physical improvements to transport infrastructure or operations, traffic engineering,
control of road space and changes in price, although some soft factors do include
elements of this nature. (For example, workplace travel plans often including parking
1 The term ‘soft’ has been used in the literature for several years, albeit with some misgivings.
The term ‘smarter choices’ was coined at the final stage of this study by the Department for
Transport clients, as an alternative label for the type of measures studied.3
restrictions). ‘Soft’ also refers to the nature of the traveller response, with initiatives
often addressing psychological motivations for travel choice as well as economic
ones. There is an emphasis on management and marketing activities rather than
operations and investment. The measures are often largely or entirely omitted from
established modelling and appraisal techniques, which deal with measures that are
assumed to be more reliably understood (although the incorporation of such
measures into standard modelling tools is undoubtedly an important issue).
In the study reported here, 10 types of measures were included, namely:
• workplace travel plans – where employers put in place a package of measures
primarily aimed at encouraging and enabling their employees to travel to work more
sustainably.
• school travel plans – where a package of measures is introduced at an individual
school to encourage and enable children to travel to school more sustainably.
• personalised travel planning – where individuals are offered information carefully
tailored to their personal and locational circumstances to encourage and enable them
to travel more sustainably.
• public transport information and marketing – which includes advertising
campaigns, the provision of information in more accessible formats and simplified
ticketing schemes.
• travel awareness campaigns – which involve a wide range of media aimed at
improving general public awareness of the problems resulting from transport choices,
and what can be done to solve problems, including changing personal behaviour.
• car clubs – an alternative to private car ownership, where individuals are
encouraged to join a club that gives them access to a number of vehicles parked in
their neighbourhood, where they pay when they use vehicles.
• car sharing schemes – where individuals are encouraged to share their private
vehicles for particular journeys (also known as ‘car pooling’ or ‘ride sharing’ in other
countries).
• teleworking – where employers encourage employees to adopt a range of remote
working practices, including working at home or in a closer location than their main
workplace, for some or all of the time.
• teleconferencing – where telecommunications are used to facilitate contacts that
might otherwise have involved business travel.
• home shopping – where customers purchase goods which are subsequently
delivered directly to them, rather than purchasing and transporting them from a store.
To examine the potential of these different measures, the study methodology
involved a number of stages. These included:
a) A review of previous overview studies of soft measures
Seven overview studies were identified and analysed, as discussed in the next
section.
b) A review of the literature about each of the 10 measures listed above
Over 250 references about individual measures were reviewed in detail, with many of
these references having themselves collated together results from different initiatives.
c) The creation of a long-list of approximately 60 case studies of smarter
choice schemes that had been implemented in the UK4
This was drawn up based on the project team’s knowledge, strengthened by
consultation with experts and the UK Department for Transport. Telephone
conversations, web searches and analyses of local authority progress reports were
then used to obtain further information about each suggested case study. This
information was summarised, and some of this material was used in the main report.
d) Detailed interviews with 24 case studies
From the long-list of 60 case studies, 24 case studies were selected. In making these
choices, key priorities were that the selection should aim for a balance between
metropolitan, urban and rural areas; that more than one measure should be
investigated in at least some of the case study areas to seek insight into synergy
between measures; and that the selection should include some examples of local
authorities that had been less successful in a particular field. (This was taken to
mean that they had tried to implement a particular measure but not made great
progress, rather than that they had not shown any interest in the measure at all). A
further selection criterion was that the organisation involved should have carried out
formal monitoring or have other relevant data available about the impacts of the
initiative on car use. Having chosen the case studies, a discussion guide was
developed for each of the 10 measures, and interviews took place between July and
September 2003. Initial interviews were usually with one to three people, with follow-
up work involving contact with further staff and a number of rounds of consultation
and redrafting with all those involved - up to 30 further e-mail and telephone contacts
per interview.
e) Analysis of the information gathered
Following the collation of the evidence, each measure was analysed individually,
using a series of specific topic headings to guide the analysis. The general topics
examined for each smarter choice measure were:
• Where have different interventions been used – what is the scope of current
experience?; 
• What is the scale of existing interventions - how many people have been affected,
and are there particular types of people or types of areas where these initiatives
are particularly appropriate?; 
• What is known about the effects of each initiative on car use?; 
• How do impacts alter over time?; 
• What other effects have been achieved, such as improved accessibility?; 
• What resources have been needed to achieve these effects, in terms of both
staffing and budgets?; 
• Is there any information about synergy between particular interventions and other
soft or hard measures?; 
• In areas where smarter choice measures have been implemented, what does
data available from other sources indicate about overall trends in car traffic
levels?; 
• In the future, what is the likely viable scale, cost and impact of such interventions,
if they are scaled up, and what are the key issues and policies involved in scaling
up such measures?
The final part of the study then drew together the overall conclusions about the
potential traffic impacts of each measure, and its cost effectiveness, together with
more general observations about synergy, the importance of context, the offsetting
effects of induced traffic and changes in effects over time.5
It should be noted that the conventions for reporting the impacts of different
measures were often different, and used different units – varying from overall
estimations of impacts on traffic, through to estimations of impacts on car kilometres
or car trips. In both the main study and this paper, great care has therefore been
taken to make sure that the correct units are quoted in relation to any reported data.
When looking at individual measures, the conventions typically used for analysing
that measure were used. For example, for workplace travel plans, the reduction in
the share of trips made as a car driver was used as the main measure of impact.
Various techniques were then used to ‘standardise’ the impacts of the different
measures for the overall calculations (as described in this paper in the sections on
‘cost impact ratios’ and ‘overall impacts on traffic’).
f) Consultation and revision
Following completion of the study, a substantial consultation phase with external
experts was undertaken in the early part of 2004. Chapters about the individual
smarter choice measures were sent to the case study interviewees and other experts
in each field. Approximately 110 people were consulted in total. Overview chapters
were subject to intensive scrutiny by different parts of the UK Department for
Transport. The material was then significantly revised, and finalised in the light of
comments received.
Review of previous studies
In addition to an extensive literature reporting evidence on specific measures, seven
previous studies were identified which had, themselves, reviewed national and
international evidence in order to make estimates of the overall effect of a package of
soft measures on traffic levels in British conditions. These had been undertaken by
Dodgson et al (1997, 2000), WS Atkins (1999), Halcrow Group (2001, 2002), James
(2002), Sloman (2003), Steer Davies Gleave (2003) and Transport for London (2003).
Of these, the Halcrow work had been particularly influential, though controversial
when compared with other study findings, in that it assumed that soft measures only
had limited potential for traffic reduction, although allowing, in principle, for bigger
effects in specific locations of interest. Their order of magnitude informed
Departmental advice to the UK Multi-Modal Studies teams, who were guided towards
the total potential effect of a package of smarter choice measures being around 5%.
Subsequent commentators, including James (2002) and three peer reviewers
(Goodwin 2003, Bonsall 2003 and Headicar 2003) all concluded that this work
underestimated the potential of smarter choice measures.
As part of our study, the seven studies identified above were all reanalysed, including
contact and discussions with the original authors. This analysis suggested that the
main causes of differences between studies were:
• Issues of measurement and definition;
• Differences in the assessment of the realistic pace of future policy initiatives and
market developments;
• Differences between ‘expected’ and ‘potential’ outcomes; and
• Differences in the range of measures included in the studies.
In discussions, Halcrow clarified that their study made the policy presumption that,
broadly speaking, there would be no great increase in priority or Government
attention given to this area of work, (Bayliss, 2004). In contrast, some of the other
studies had focused instead on the potential of such measures if Government policy6
attempted to maximise their impacts. Hence, a significant cause of discrepancy in
findings was due to different assumptions about the future intensity of the
implementation of such measures.
A summary of the results is given in table 1.
<Insert table 1 about here>
Overall, the lowest estimates of effect given in the studies tended to emerge when it
was assumed that there would be little momentum for such policies; when the
impacts of specific factors were averaged over 24 hour, national traffic flows; and/or
when caveats were made about induced traffic (i.e. the danger that any reductions in
car traffic generated through soft measures would be offset by other people choosing
to drive more). At the other extreme, the highest figures from the studies emerged as
a result of assuming the simultaneous application of many different, consistent
initiatives (including supporting ‘hard’ measures), and where results were expressed
as a proportion of the traffic levels in a specific locality, by journey purpose or by time
of day.
Given the sharpness of the debate engendered by the reports, our study found a
surprisingly consistent underlying picture emerging when the data were reanalysed.
In particular, the results suggested that, with lower intensity application and/or
without support from complementary hard measures, there was scope for soft
measures to reduce traffic levels, but not very much: perhaps 4% or 5% at the
national level, with a range around this according to local circumstances. With higher
intensity application (and emphasising the importance of supportive hard measures
either by assumption or explicitly), the estimated potential for soft factor interventions
was to reduce traffic levels by 10% to 15% as a national average, and 15% to 20% in
favourable local conditions. There were also some estimates that, in specific
circumstances, figures higher than this could be achieved, again, assuming that
appropriate supportive hard measures were in place.
Two measures, workplace and school travel plans, were common to six of the seven
studies, the estimated effect ranging from the lowest figure of about 1% of traffic, to
the highest in the best specific local circumstances of 9%. The central estimates for
workplace and school travel plans, taking the studies together, were 3% of traffic
nationally and 8% in the best local conditions.
These figures provided a useful basis against which to compare our own estimates.
Analysis of individual measures – the example of workplace travel
plans
The main part of our report involved analysing each of the 10 individual measures in
turn, attempting to address the key study topics outlined earlier. The information base
for each was substantial, and it is not possible to summarise all of the conclusions
here. To give an indication of the type of analysis conducted, some of the findings
and conclusions relating to workplace travel plans are reported in this section.
Following sections then report on the findings for the other measures, which were
based on the same type of analysis.
a) Evidence assessed
In analysing workplace travel plans, the main sources of evidence used were:7
• Detailed case study evidence from seven workplace travel plan programmes,
taking place in Birmingham, Bristol, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire,
Merseyside, Nottingham and York.
• Information from related case studies, namely the car sharing schemes in Milton
Keynes and Buckinghamshire, the use of personalised journey plans as part of
South Yorkshire PTE’s Travel Options Planning Service, teleworking and
teleconferencing at British Telecom and elements of travel awareness
campaigning in York.
• Work by University of Westminster (1998), Steer Davies Gleave (2001), Addison
and Fraser (2002), Rye (2002) and internal Department for Transport analysis
about the scale of workplace travel plan activities, (although only Rye, 2002, gave
estimates for the scale of impacts across all employers, rather than for specific
categories of employers).
• Studies by Organisational Coaching/Shreffler (1996), Shoup (1997), Ligtermoet
(1998), TCRP (1994), Touwen (1999), Napier University, Open University and
WS Atkins (2001) and Cairns et al (2002) about the impacts, costs and key
success factors involved in workplace travel plans.
b) Scale of activities
The seven case study authorities were asked about the number of companies and
employees in their areas in total, and in relation to those that they were working with
on workplace travel planning. The results are shown in table 2. 
 
<Insert table 2 about here>
Three of the city authorities (Nottingham, Birmingham and York) had managed to
engage organisations representing about 30% of staff. (Bristol's engagement was
lower, with 13% of staff involved.) In contrast, the larger authorities (Cambridgeshire,
Merseyside and Buckinghamshire) had engaged organisations representing 8-12%
of employees (although in Cambridgeshire, the proportion of employees engaged in
travel planning rose to 29% if looking only at the City and South Cambridgeshire,
where the local authority had concentrated its efforts on travel plan work). All
locations had engaged with only a small fraction of total companies in their local area,
and preferred to concentrate their efforts on the larger employers. These data
compare with work by Rye (2002) which concluded that, in 2002, workplace travel
plans could already be affecting approximately 12% of the workforce nationally. Many
of the other studies of workplace travel plan activities have shown that take-up of
workplace travel plans has been increasing substantially over time, and have also
clarified that large organisations, and public sector organisations are more likely to be
adopting plans. The potential future scale for travel plan activity is discussed in
section e).
c) Impacts on car use
A summary of results from the literature about the impacts of workplace travel plans
on car use is given in table 3.
<Insert table 3 about here>8
The literature suggested that travel plans typically reduce car use by about 15-20%,
with higher reductions of perhaps 20-25% from plans incorporating measures such
as parking management and bus subsidy, and lower reductions of perhaps 5-15% for
plans that do not incorporate such measures. Location is not a key determinant of the
degree of change in behaviour achieved by travel plans, although organisations in
urban locations may be more likely to undertake travel planning, and typically start
with lower levels of car use. All plans are individual, and results vary significantly
from organisation to organisation.
As well as analysing the literature evidence, each of the case study authorities were
asked for any results that they had about the success of individual travel plans in
their area, and, also, for any monitoring of the overall effects of their work. All
authorities were able to give information about at least one individual plan in their
area, and information for a total of 26 organisations was collected.
Averaged across all 26 organisations (representing over 33,000 staff), the weighted
average reduction in car driver trips was 17.8%
2. (This is remarkably close to the
18% reduction recorded in Cairns et al. 2002, which was an in-depth study of travel
plan effectiveness). For the four case study areas with data from a number of
organisations, the average of the recorded results for individual organisations in their
areas varied from -7.5% to -27.3%. Three case study areas (Nottingham, Merseyside
and Birmingham) also gave estimates of the overall effects of their work. These were
in the range of a 10-15% reduction in car use.
As well as examining ‘average’ achievements, the distribution of individual travel plan
results was also examined. This highlighted that the achievements of employers
differ widely. In some cases, a travel plan appeared to have had no effect, as car
driving had increased (three examples). Others had achieved a modest reduction in
car driving (three organisations reported reductions of less than 5%) or more
substantial reductions. Specifically, there were 18 organisations which had reduced
car driving by more than 10%, including 9 organisations which had reduced car
driving by more than a quarter. The distribution of results for the 26 organisations is
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
<Insert figure 1 about here>
This distribution suggests that the overall average result (17.8%) is reasonably
indicative of what a travel plan can achieve, as individual plans are relatively
uniformly distributed around that point. Clearly, there were some high performers
(achieving reductions in car driver trips of over 35%), and some disappointments
(where travel planning appeared to have made no difference). However, the majority
had reduced car driving by between 1% and 35% with a typical plan achieving
reductions in the range of perhaps 10-30%. One caveat is that the travel plans which
had achieved significant reductions in car use were all, almost certainly, relatively
well developed plans and would not include the typical experience from organisations
which were only just beginning their work, or which had abandoned work at an early
stage.
d) Cost-impact ratios
The seven case study authorities were also asked about expenditure on their
workplace travel plan activities, for both current activities and activities in their first
2 As previously mentioned, the change in the proportion of staff commute trips made as a car
driver was used as the main measure of workplace travel plan impact.9
year of intensive work (together with how long they had been undertaking intensive
workplace travel planning promotion). Separately, they were asked to be more
specific about staffing and resources devoted to these activities, and a cross-check
was made, to ensure that staffing costs had been included in the expenditure
discussed. When this was not the case, the figure of £25,000 per full-time employee
was added to give an overall cost of the work. (This process was checked back with
the interviewees).
From the information about costs, together with the information about the scale of
activities, it was possible to estimate that workplace travel plans were typically
costing local authorities between about £2 and £4 per year per employee affected,
where the high end of the range was associated with longer-term programmes and
the implementation of more substantial measures, such as a grant scheme for
employers. (Note that this figure does not include the potential costs to individual
employers as a result of implementing travel plans. Work by Cairns et al 2002
suggested an average gross cost of £47 per full time employee for UK employers
implementing travel plans, whilst Organisational Coaching/Schreffler estimated costs
of $100-200 for US and Dutch employers. These estimates do not include any
potential cost-savings to the employer from the beneficial results of travel planning,
such as improved staff retention, or offsetting funding generated by measures such
as introducing car park charges. None of the existing literature gave an alternative
estimate of the costs to the authorities of promoting plans to employers).
As well as calculating the costs of programmes, our study also aimed to estimate
cost-impact ratios of the work programme undertaken by the case study authorities.
The calculations are shown in table 4.
< Insert table 4 about here>
To estimate the total expenditure on their programmes, costs were based on the
assumption that expenditure had grown linearly from the first year of intensive work
to the current year of work. The majority of expenditure by local authorities involved
ongoing costs – i.e revenue funding. The small amount of capital expenditure
reported was annualised at 3.5%, in line with Government guidance.
To calculate impacts, two models of the impacts of the authorities’ work were
developed
3. The first (Model A) assumed that for all the employees affected by a
travel plan, an average reduction in car driver kilometres of 5% was achieved. The
second (Model B) was slightly more complex. In the interview process, the authorities
were asked to estimate the proportion of employees affected by travel plans who
were in organisations with ‘good’ travel plans, ‘average’ travel plans and who were
‘just starting work’. Respective reductions in car driver kilometres of 18%, 10% and
0% were then applied to employees affected by these different categories of plans.
For both models, the impacts of travel work were assumed to increase linearly, from
zero, in the first year of intensive work, to current levels, and it was assumed that,
even if no more money was spent, there would be some impact in future years, which
would decline at a rate of 40% p.a..
3 In both cases, the reduction in car driver kilometres was assumed to be directly proportional
to the reduction in car driver trips, since there was no available evidence on which to base an
alternative calculation or which suggested otherwise.10
Throughout the cost impact calculations, the assumptions used were designed to be
conservative – both the levels of impact and decay rates used were relatively
pessimistic given the evidence reviewed.
Given the data about the costs of each programme, and two (conservative)
estimations of the impacts of each programme, it was then possible to calculate the
costs per kilometre saved. Overall, the calculated cost impact ratios for workplace
travel planning ranged from 0.1 pence to 2 pence per kilometre saved.
e) Scaling up activities
Interviewees were also asked a number of questions about the viability of scaling up
their activities over time, including consideration of issues such as saturation (i.e.
how far those likely to participate had already been reached). Three interviewees
were prepared to give estimates about the possible scale of future work, which
implied that the upper limits for activities may lie somewhere between 15% of the
workforce (the estimate from Buckinghamshire) to 40-50% of the workforce, (the
estimated limit given by York and Birmingham). The difference in limits probably
partly depends on the type of area, with companies based in urban locations reported
to be more willing to participate in traffic reduction initiatives. Interviewees also
discussed the potential to increase the effectiveness of travel plans over time, the
resources that they would like in order to achieve goals over the next 10 years and a
number of other issues for scaling up activities.
Findings for individual measures
The preceding section has described the type of analysis that was conducted for
each of the measures studied. The overall conclusions for each of the measures
were as follows:
• Individual workplace travel plans had typically reduced commuter car driving by
between 10% and 30%, though the best ones had achieved significantly more
than that. The typical cost to the local authority of promoting workplace travel
plans was £2-£4 per affected employee per year. City authorities prioritising
workplace travel plans had typically managed to engage with organisations
representing about 30% of the workforce, whilst county authorities had managed
to engage with organisations representing about 10% of the workforce.
• Where school travel plans were implemented across a local authority area, on
average, they had cut school run traffic by between 8% and 15%, with individual,
high-performing schools commonly achieving reductions of over 20%, and,
sometimes, considerably more. Many local authorities were devoting more
resources to school travel work than to workplace travel plans, and some
expected to reach nearly all schools in their area in the next 10 years
4.
• Personalised travel planning initiatives were typically reporting overall average
reductions in car driver trips by their target group of 7%-15% in urban areas, and
2-6% in rural and smaller urban areas. Costs for large scale implementation are
likely to be considerably cheaper than those incurred in the pilot projects studied,
and could be in the order of less than £20 per person targeted, (with some
suggesting figures of half this magnitude).
4 Since the interview work for our study took place, the Department for Transport and
Department for Education and Skills have issued an explicit aim that all schools should have
travel plans in place by the end of the decade.11
• Public transport information and marketing schemes (as defined earlier) had
delivered clearly recorded increases in bus use. Whilst it is never possible to
totally separate out the effects of marketing from infrastructure or service
improvements, there was evidence suggesting that schemes incorporating
targeted information provision, re-branding and/or marketing campaigns had
typically achieved twice the patronage increases of those which had not. City-
wide budgets for such work of £60,000-£300,000 per year (including public and
private sector investment) had helped to deliver city-wide increases in bus use of
1.5%-5% a year, when combined with other improvements.
• Travel awareness campaigns varied in nature, from relatively general campaigns
to closely targeted intensive approaches. Both types reported evidence of car use
reductions, although intensive approaches had tended to achieve higher levels of
individual change. Many were starting to focus on the positive health benefits
from alternative transport policies. In many cases, travel awareness campaigns
were used to win support for, and perhaps intensify, other specific initiatives, and
the potential value of national awareness campaigning was mentioned in relation
to many of the other initiatives.
• Car clubs were estimated to lead to an average reduction of 5 privately-owned
cars per car club vehicle. They required start-up funding in the order of £50,000
to £150,000 per club which should lead to them becoming self-financing. At the
time of the study, car clubs were a very new initiative in the UK, and for the first
schemes introduced, there had been a tendency to set unrealistic timescales for
breaking even, perhaps partly to justify public funding. Initially, car club initiatives
had been focused on high density urban residential locations, although there was
increasing interest in the viability of low-cost operational models in rural areas.
• Organised car-sharing clearly had effects on overall car use, although these were
dependent on other factors, including parking regimes, the balance of users
drawn from car driving or from other modes, and the amount of informal car
sharing already taking place. Set up and running costs varied significantly and
were primarily determined by the extent of associated publicity and marketing
that had taken place.
• Teleworking had been growing rapidly, and was typically resulting in a reduction
of between 2 and 6 home-work journeys per teleworker per week. Evidence
suggested that, although a commonly expressed concern, changes in car use for
other purposes, or by other household members, or due to changes in home
location, did not substantially offset these reductions in car use. In fact, there
were some instances where car use by households of teleworkers had fallen for
other journey purposes, as well as for commuting. The costs incurred by
employers in promoting telework had often been offset by business savings.
• Teleconferencing had typically reduced overall business travel kilometres by
between 10% and 30% in organisations that promoted its use. Many
commentators have suggested that there is great potential for more widespread
use of teleconferencing. However, public sector promotion may be needed to
ensure mainstream adoption. Business savings could be substantial, in terms of
reduced travel costs and more efficient use of staff time.
• For groceries, at the time of the study, home shopping accounted for less than
5% of all grocery sales (by value), but was estimated to reach 10%-15% over the12
next decade, leading to potential reductions of 7-11% in all food shopping vehicle
kilometres. Meanwhile, investment in better drop off facilities for all types of home
shopping could reduce travel for customers in some circumstances (where their
alternative is travelling to a more remote collection point) and could also
substantially improve the efficiency of delivery vehicle operations.
The findings reported above describe the main conclusions for each of the individual
measures, discussed in their own terms. A core part of the work also involved
drawing ‘overall’ conclusions about the costs and impacts of such measures,
including consideration of issues such as ‘double counting’. These results are
described in the following sections.
Cost impact ratios
In line with the approach described for workplace travel plans, cost-impact ratios
were calculated for all of the measures. Results are given in table 5. 
 
<Insert table 5 about here>
The cost-impact ratios calculated varied from about 0.1 pence to about 10 pence
expenditure per vehicle kilometre reduced, with most figures tending to be at the
lower end of this range. Those at the upper end of the range typically included some
supporting hard measures implementation. In relation to a scenario where a package
of soft measures would be implemented intensively – the ‘high intensity’ scenario
outlined in the next section – the approximate average cost (based on existing
expenditure) was estimated to be about 1.5 pence per vehicle kilometre saved.
These figures should be treated as indicative of orders of magnitude only
5.
These costs did not include any changes in personal expenditure by the individuals
modifying their behaviour, or spending by the private sector (unless a direct grant or
contract by the public sector). There was also no discounting to allow for erosion of
benefit due to induced traffic. This was in line with the general approach used in the
study, which is discussed further in the penultimate section. The figures given also
reflected experience to date. Over time, costs may be expected to fall, due to
economies of scale which reduce the unit costs of large initiatives, and there may be
learning and the development of better methods which increase the effectiveness of
soft measures. Longer term, there may be diminishing returns, as the achievable
limits to behavioural change are approached.
As well as examining cost impact ratios, the study also looked at the cost-benefit
ratio of smarter choice measures. A full cost-benefit analysis was beyond the scope
of the study. However, it was possible to make use of other studies which had
calculated the congestion relief and other benefits derived from a reduction in vehicle
traffic in various conditions. There is a large literature on this subject, (see for
example, Potter et al 2003 and Samson et al 2001). At the time of the study, the most
authoritative figures used for assessing the value for money in the allocation of public
5 The estimates of costs per vehicle mile reduced are now being used, by others, to calculate
the follow-on costs of marginal carbon abatement. However, note that to find the full resource
cost of saving carbon by these measures, it is necessary to allow for the net economic costs
and benefits of the traffic reductions. In general, the effect of allowing for the wider costs and
benefits will tend to be cost-reducing, meaning that the overall net welfare cost of reducing a
tonne of carbon by these measures will be reduced, and potentially outweighed by the
benefits.This means that the marginal carbon abatement costs for these measures may be
more favourable than appears at face value.13
funds were those agreed between the Strategic Rail Authority and the Department for
Transport for assessing the benefit of shifting ‘sensitive’ lorry miles from road to rail –
in particular, the estimated values of congestion costs in a variety of different road
conditions (Strategic Rail Authority, 2003)
6.
These data suggest that each car kilometre removed brings an overall average
benefit in reduced congestion of about 15 pence. This figure varies with location,
ranging from about 45 pence in city streets, to 3 pence in rural and other urban
streets. These figures do not distinguish by time of day: since the benefits of reducing
traffic are very sensitive to the level of congestion, the figures would be higher at
peak periods. They would also be higher if other external benefits, such as
environmental impacts, were included.
Comparing our average calculated costs (1.5 pence per car kilometre removed) with
the average benefit in congestion relief (15 pence per kilometre removed) therefore
indicated that the ratio of benefit: cost was in the order of 10:1 on average, and many
times this in congested urban conditions. In short, expenditure on soft measures
seems to represent very good value for money in terms of the benefits obtained per
pound spent. The issue of induced traffic needs addressing (as discussed below),
and, logically, at some stage, diminishing returns should set in, but there was no
indication from the evidence reviewed that this was imminent, or that it would erode
benefits sufficiently to offset the very positive margin of net benefit, given the time
frame and policy range considered.
Overall impacts on traffic
A final, key question addressed in the study was – what effect could smarter choice
measures have on traffic levels in the UK in about 10 years? To consider this
question, two scenarios were developed. These were defined as follows:
• Low intensity: a projection of the present rate of expenditure and level of
commitment on soft measures, taking account of the existing important initiatives
by the most committed local authorities, and commercial initiatives already being
undertaken by companies.
• High intensity: a projection based on a substantial expansion of the activity,
commitment and resources devoted to smarter choice measures, which would
still be consistent with practical and realistic experience, the current judgements
of those working at the local level in practical implementation, and feasible levels
of expenditure, given known constraints of staffing and funding generally. This
scenario presupposed commitment to such measures at both local level and
national level, but did allow for a degree of variation according to local
circumstances.
Both scenarios were based on the study team’s judgement about what could be
achieved by a realistic level of commitment to a programme building up over a ten
year period. However, the results were not intended to be a ‘forecast for 2014’,
because no allowance was made for other things that would have changed by then
(demography, income, economic growth, road user charging, etc.). In addition, no
adjustment was made for induced traffic or for synergy, as justified and explained in
the following section. However, some adjustments were made to avoid double
6 This data source also includes values for accidents, noise, pollution, climate change,
infrastructure costs, a quantitative estimate for other unquantified factors, and adjustments for
taxation. However, the non-congestion elements are based on less well established evidence,
and were therefore not used in our report.14
counting for the effects of initiatives typically aimed at the journey to work (namely,
workplace travel plans, car sharing and teleworking).
To assess the impacts of smarter choice measures, a detailed calculation was
undertaken. This involved:
1. Calculating ‘impact’ factors for each of the individual measures
2. Applying these impact factors to base data from the Department for Transport’s
National Traffic Model, in order to calculate overall traffic impacts for different
categories of traffic.
These stages are described in more detail below.
a) Calculating the effects of individual measures
For each measure, the potential ‘impact’ of each was estimated, given about ten
years of implementation. This was based on estimations about two dimensions -
‘coverage’ and ‘effectiveness’. ‘Coverage’ was defined as being the proportion of the
population which might be affected in some way by the measure concerned, whilst
‘effectiveness’ was defined as being the amount by which car kilometres travelled
could be reduced within the affected population. The product of ‘coverage’ x
‘effectiveness’ was termed ‘impact’. For 6 of the soft factors, there was insufficient
information to give different estimates according to area type. The exceptions were
workplace travel plans, personalised travel planning, public transport information and
marketing, and car clubs: for these, urban and non-urban estimates were calculated
separately, and the non-urban estimates were mostly lower because of the generally
poorer quality of public transport.
Inevitably, as in any scenario-building exercise, a lot of assumptions were used.
These were carefully based on the literature and case study evidence discussed
earlier. The main intention was to get an indicative order of magnitude of the potential
of smarter choice measures to assess whether, as discussed in the introduction, their
potential role could be significant or not. As part of this process, the study team
explored the effects of varying the assumptions used, within the range of what
seemed credible. Varying the assumptions within this range did not lead to materially
different results.
An example of the process used can be given for workplace travel plans, as follows:
• Nature of impact: It was assumed that the impact would be concentrated in the
peak period, and mainly on the journey to and from work. (There could also be
impacts on business, patient, shopper, student, tourist and other visitor travel, but
these were not considered due to lack of data).
• Coverage: It was assumed that there is an upper level to the proportion of the
workforce that can be readily engaged in travel plans. At the time of the study,
this was assumed to be determined principally by the proportion of employees
who worked for public sector organisations and large companies, (although, in
practice, the level might be increased by policies which create incentives for
smaller organisations to adopt travel plans). Conservatively, it was also assumed
that the proportion of the workforce that could be readily engaged would be lower
in non-urban areas than in urban areas (since employment may be more
dispersed and there may be fewer large employers). These assumptions were
consistent with findings from our case studies. Hence, on the basis of these
assumptions, interviewee estimates of what could be achieved in the future and
what was currently being achieved in the case study areas, it was estimated that
perhaps 30-50% of the workforce might be engaged in urban areas, and 10-20%15
in non urban areas in 10 years time. It should be noted that these estimates were
also conservative because most interviewees’ estimates of future coverage were
coloured by an assumption of little change in resources, and because experience
of working with clusters of SMEs was only just starting to develop.
• Effectiveness: The evidence reviewed suggested that most reasonably well-
developed travel plans achieve cuts in car use of 0-35%, with a few best practice
plans achieving cuts of over 40% and some delivering no reduction at all. Data
from the case study areas suggested that, broadly:
− 10% of travel plans achieve no change
− 20% reduce car use by >0-10%
− 35% reduce car use by >10-25%
− 25% reduce car use by >25-35%
− 10% reduce car use by over 35%.
Consistent with this breakdown, the average reduction in car use from workplace
travel plans (including poor-performing, middle-range and good-performing plans)
was 18%, and there was no clear distinction in performance between urban and
non urban areas. Hence, for both the low intensity and high intensity scenarios,
an average effectiveness of 18% was used. This was not intended to imply that
every plan would achieve an 18% reduction in car use. Some plans would
achieve more, and some less. Equally, this was not an assumption that all areas
would achieve the same results. Some flagship towns – for example, compact
cities with well-developed traffic restraint policies – could do very well, whilst
others could do less well. Moreover, it should be noted that estimates of
coverage meant that, even in the high intensity scenario, it was assumed that a
large number of employers would not be prepared to engage in travel planning at
all (representing 50% of employees in urban areas and 80% in non urban areas).
Combining this information implied, in ten years time, workplace travel plans could
potentially reduce car driver commuter trips by 5% or 9% in urban areas, and 2% or
4% in non-urban areas.
A similarly detailed procedure was conducted for each of the smarter choice
measures considered, based on the evidence from the literature and the case studies.
A summary of the impact factors derived for each of the measures is given in table 6. 
Low figures correspond to the low intensity scenario whilst high figures correspond to
the high intensity scenario.
< Insert table 6 about here>
b) Applying these effects to National Transport Model data
Actual traffic data for 2000 from the Department for Transport’s National Transport
Model was used as the base for the study calculations, rather than forecast data for
some future year. This was partly for the reasons given previously (i.e. the difficulties
of allowing for changes in other exogenous factors), and partly to correspond with the
approach taken by the other studies that were reviewed. The results could therefore
be interpreted as estimating what difference would exist in 2000, if the UK had
vigorously implemented smarter choices measures for the previous decade or so.
The data source made it possible to divide the traffic information (measured in
vehicle kilometres) by a number of dimensions. This included divisions into:
• ‘Peak weekday’ traffic (traffic between 8-9am and 5-6pm Monday – Friday); and
‘rest of week’ traffic (all traffic outside peak weekday hours);
• ‘Urban’ and ‘non-urban’ traffic, where urban traffic was defined as all traffic in16
urban areas with a population of over 10,000;
• Traffic made by different vehicle types (where non-car traffic was treated
separately, and assumed to be unaffected by any of the smarter choice
measures).
Car traffic was then subdivided into:
• ‘Work’ travel, ‘business’ travel and ‘other’ travel
1999/2001 National Travel Survey data were then used to subdivide the ‘other’
category into ‘escort education’, ‘shopping’, ‘personal business’ and ‘other’.
The impact factors for individual measures could then be applied to the appropriate
subcategories of car traffic data. This led to the results shown in table 7. 
 
<Insert table 7 about here>
c) Results
The results suggested that, under the ‘high intensity’ scenario, traffic in urban areas
could be cut by 14% overall, and 21% at peak times. Traffic in non-urban areas could
be cut by 8% overall, and 14% at peak times. Nationally (across both urban and non-
urban areas), traffic could be cut by 11% overall, and 17% at peak times.
Under the ‘low intensity’ scenario, traffic in urban areas could be cut by 3% overall,
and 5% at peak times. Traffic in non-urban areas could be cut by 2% overall, and 3%
at peak times. Nationally, traffic could be cut by 2-3% overall, and 4% at peak times.
These results are reasonably consistent with those found in the review of previous
studies. However, it should be emphasised again that these are projections of what
could happen. Achieving such reductions in practice will depend on a number of
related factors including the priority and support accorded to such measures, and the
extent to which their benefits are locked in by other measures to control induced
traffic, in an appropriately supportive context. Some of these issues are now
discussed in the next section.
Other issues for consideration
In undertaking the analysis described above, various general issues arose, which
have a central bearing on the results. These are now discussed.
a) Induced traffic
One concern about any measure which reduces congestion, which applies equally to
smarter choice measures, is that such measures have the potential to cause ‘induced
traffic’, which erodes the benefits. (For evidence about induced traffic, see, for
example, SACTRA 1994, Goodwin,1996 and Goodwin & Noland, 2003). Specifically,
those individuals choosing to reduce their car use may be simply replaced by other
individuals who are attracted by the freer road conditions to increase their car use.
Hence, it is critical to ‘lock-in’ the benefits of such measures with policies to control
induced traffic. Without this, soft measures could still succeed in changing which
individuals are using cars, therefore potentially resulting in benefits for individuals,
but could have much less effect on area wide traffic levels, congestion or
environmental impacts. Those consulted in the course of this study broadly
supported this logic of ‘locking-in’ usually expressing it in terms of soft measures
being part of an integrated transport strategy, or needing to be supported by17
complementary measures. They frequently emphasised that achieving overall
reductions in traffic depended on some or all of such supportive policies as re-
allocation of road capacity, measures to improve public transport service levels,
parking control, traffic calming, pedestrianisation, cycle networks, congestion
charging or other traffic restraint, other use of transport prices and fares, speed
regulation, or stronger legal enforcement levels.
In the analysis described above, the importance of induced traffic was recognised but
not accounted for. Specifically, the behavioural responses expected were not
adjusted in either direction, neither allowing for erosion of effects due to induced
traffic, nor enhancement of soft factor effects due to the other measures being
introduced to prevent induced traffic such as pricing or reallocation of road capacity.
This position may be interpreted as an assumption, made for analytical purposes,
that ‘locking-in’ measures would be introduced at just sufficient intensity to maintain
the changes brought about by soft measures, but not more. This was primarily to
enable the effects of smarter choice measures to be clarified in themselves. (It was
not an implied judgement that such a level would be optimal, or, indeed, very likely.)  
 
b) Timescales of behavioural response
Most studies of the effects of hard measures on behaviour, such as studies of
changes in price (involving econometric analysis of time series data) or studies of the
expansion or contraction of road capacity (involving analysis of traffic counts), have
concluded that effects on behaviour can build up over a period of several years, with
typical adjustment periods of 5-10 years, and, in a few cases, up to about 20 years.
Theory, logic and intuition, but little evidence, suggests that this build-up process
could also apply to the behavioural responses involved in some soft measures. If so,
monitoring for only a short period will underestimate the impacts of such measures,
after allowing also for the longer term effects of other factors (eg income, car
ownership etc) which may be operating in the opposite direction to the behaviour
change effect of the measures. Other soft factors, however, may have the effect of
shortening the behavioural response period, by making immediate information
available, and alternatives worth considering, which would otherwise only filter
through to some travellers much more slowly, or not at all. Further, some soft
initiatives seem to need reinforcement or refreshment after a period. More
understanding of these issues would be useful.
c) Synergy
There is considerable interest in the potential positive synergies and interactions
between different soft measures, and between soft and hard measures. The main
mechanisms of synergy are assumed to be: strengthening awareness, intent, or the
range of opportunities available; reaching thresholds enabling larger behavioural
responses; or reducing offsetting effects which would undermine the impact of the
soft factor intervention.
However, there are also concerns about circumstances where interactions may be
negative. For example, there is concern that when approaching saturation levels of
effect for particular markets, further reductions in car use will be increasingly difficult,
or that, if congestion is overcome, this could, itself, reduce the enthusiasm for
introducing or responding to soft instruments.
Overall, perhaps, the main significance of arguments about both synergies and
negative interactions is that consistent application of soft and hard measures could
increase the speed at which maximum realistic behavioural shifts are achieved, and18
inconsistent or partial application could substantially undermine the likelihood of
having positive effects. Since our study was completed, the UK Department for
Transport has designated three UK towns – Worcester, Peterborough and Darlington
- to be ‘sustainable travel demonstration towns’ and is funding them to implement a
range of smarter choice measures, partly to try to identify the synergistic effects that
result. Transport for London is also developing a similar initiative, based in the
London Borough of Sutton. Cairns (forthcoming) explores the potential synergy
between smarter choice measures and road user charging.
d) Policy context
The literature and the case study interviewees all stressed the importance of the
policy context of soft factor interventions, and discussed various barriers to
successful implementation, and ‘wish-lists’ of improvements that would make
implementation easier. At local level, officials concerned with developing soft
measures often felt that their work was still not recognised as being of central
importance in transport strategy, which was affecting resources, political support,
career expectations and profile. There was also a perception that the relevant
professional skills were not widely available or given sufficient importance. The key,
overarching policy initiatives mentioned as being important to achieving the full
potential of smarter choice measures were:
• A clear national strategy in favour of traffic reduction, with recognition that
smarter choice measures could make a valuable and concrete contribution to this.
• The availability of new revenue funding streams for local authorities, or greater
flexibility in the use of capital budgets.
• Specific policies to support particular initiatives, including: more tax breaks for
workplace travel plans; a statutory requirement for schools to have travel plans;
stronger planning guidance requiring more implementation of smarter choice
measures in parallel with new development; greater regulation of public transport
and less restrictions on co-operative arrangements between operators; a national
lead on engaging with ‘hard-to-reach’ stakeholders such as leisure providers and
trade unions; and greater dissemination of existing national experience.
• Greater implementation of local policies including: reallocation of road capacity,
parking restraint, congestion charging and workplace parking levies to encourage
workplace travel plans; traffic calming, 20mph limits, safe crossing facilities and
parking restrictions outside schools to complement school travel planning; fast-
tracking of traffic orders for dedicated parking spaces to facilitate the distribution
of car club vehicles; new national parking arrangements for car sharers; and
vehicle access restrictions, specific parking rights and investment in local drop-off
facilities to encourage home shopping and less polluting logistics systems.
Conclusions
There is a growing body of practical experience and understanding of the role for
smarter choice measures in transport policy. Such interventions provide a number of
different ways of encouraging better informed traveller attitudes, and more benign or
efficient ways of travelling. The results reported here suggest that, within
approximately 10 years, such measures have the potential to reduce national traffic
levels by about 11%, with reductions of up to 21% in peak period urban traffic.
Moreover, they represent relatively good value for money, with schemes potentially
generating benefit: cost ratios which are in excess of 10:1.
The results of this study perhaps challenge expectations. A key question is – are
these results credible, and if not, what is the difficulty? A review presenting a decade19
of transport research by Goodwin et al (2007) offers one answer: this work has
highlighted that the amount of inherent variability in individuals’ behaviour is already
at the sort of levels reported (ca. 20%), even without policy intervention, but this is
not widely known or appreciated, partly because of the dominance of surveys and
models which emphasise average or normal behaviour rather than variability in
behaviour. Once the present amount of ‘churn’, and the need for associated
supportive measures are factored into expectations, the large numbers generated by
the study do not necessarily seem unrealistic. In addition, since the report was
published, various agencies have reported results which are broadly in line with the
findings of the study, in relation to both individual measures and overall, with
particularly promising results emerging from the three Sustainable Travel
Demonstration Towns, as reported, for example, in Cairns S (forthcoming).
In a favourable wider policy context, then, smarter choice measures could be
sufficiently effective in reducing car use, and offer sufficiently good value for money,
that they merit serious consideration for an expanded role in transport strategy.
Overall, the effects of soft policies will depend on the scale of implementation chosen
as an act of policy by central and local government, associated with, and interacting
with, decisions on other policies, including prices, service improvements, traffic
control and management and infrastructure changes. However, the central
conclusion of the study is that the impact of such measures need not be marginal,
and could be very significant in addressing traffic, given the right support.20
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Table 1: Summary of previous studies estimating the ‘overall’ impacts of smarter choice measures on total traffic levels
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Bold figures as stated explicitly in sources, others inferred. Sloman’s figures as in source but recalculated as % of total traffic.23
Table 2: Summary of the scale of local authority work on travel plans (summer 2003)














Birmingham 136,000 145 (+20*) 29 0.5-0.6
Bristol 29,960 60 (+25#) 13 --
Buckinghamshire 21,700 33 11 --
Cambridgeshire 34,000 44 (+16*) 29 or 12~ 0.5 or 0.3
Merseyside 55,870 57 8 --
Nottingham 52,000 35 (+265#) 28 0.5
City of York 26,187 30 29 0.6
*These are support companies – e.g. cycle shops – and non employer steering group members such as
the Cambridge cycling campaign.
# These are members of travel plan networks who are largely inactive, or with whom the council has
little involvement
~ First figure is the % of employees reached in the two main target districts for Cambridgeshire County
Council (Cambridge City and South Cambridgeshire). The second figure is for the percentage of all
employees affected throughout the county.24




A selection of ‘good practice’ travel plans reduced commuter car
driver trips by an average of at least* 18%. Plans which included
parking management measures achieved an average reduction in
car driver trips of >24%, compared with >10% for those that did





Successful travel plans in the US had typically reduced vehicle
trips by 19%.
Successful travel plans in the Netherlands had typically reduced
vehicle mileage by 20%.
Shoup (1997) Eight Californian employers offering cash for parking had reduced
single occupancy driving by an average of 13% and vehicle miles
by 12%.
TCRP (1994) 49 US employers with travel plans had achieved an average
vehicle trip reduction of 15%. Averages for different types of plans
were:
9% if offering commuting alternatives only (such as van pools)
16% if offering financial incentives only (such as bus fare subsidy)
25% if offering financial incentives and services
Ligtermoet
(1998)
40 Dutch employers (plus an unspecified numbers of others from
review work) provided information about different types of plans.
This suggested average reductions in vehicle kilometres of:
6-10% for plans with ‘basic’ measures
15-23% for plans with ‘luxury’ measures
Touwen (1999) Information from different types of Dutch travel plan suggested
average reductions in single occupancy vehicle kilometres of:
8% for plans with ‘basic’ measures
20% for plans with ‘luxury’ measures
* Data and analysis in several of the cases were judged to lead to an underestimate (of unknown size)
of the effects of the travel plan work on car commuting, meaning that only a ‘minimum average’ could be
calculated.
^ The literature varies in how the impacts on car travel are reported (i.e. vehicle trips, vehicle kilometres
etc.) The results reported here quote the study results in their own terms.
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Length of time scheme has been running
intensively (years)
5 5 3 6 2 8 1
Estimated total expenditure, with capital
costs annualised (£)
310,000 350,000 243,700 247,500 196,000 900,000 52,000
Staff affected by travel plan in current year 136,000 29,960 21,700 34,000 55,870 52,000 26,187
% driving (2001 census) 56 51 72 52 55 45 48
Implied number of drivers affected by travel
plans
76160 15160 15624 17748 30617 23244 12622
Model A
Driver reduction (all travel plans -5%)^ 3808 758 781 887 1531 1162 631
Kilometres saved in current year # 27052032 5384747 5549645 6304090 10875073 8256269 4483382
Total kilometres saved 108208128 21538987 16648934 28368403 27187683 45409478 8966764
Cost per kilometre saved (pence) 0.3 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.7 2.0 0.6
Model B
Good travel plans (-18%) 30%* 46% 55% 63% 42% 96% 34%
Average travel plans (-10%) 60%* 48% 6% 1% 12% 0% 20%
Travel work just starting (0%) 10%* 7% 38% 36% 45% 4% 46%
Driver reduction 8682 1983 1641 2030 2682 4017 1025
Kilometres saved in current year # 61678633 14086498 11654254 14423757 19053128 28533665 7281012
Total kilometres saved 246714532 56345990 34962762 64906907 47632820 156935157 14562025
Cost per kilometre saved (pence) 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4
^ 5% was taken as being the absolute minimum level of overall impact, following the discussions with the case study authorities.
~ Cambridgeshire A: calculations based on data for the districts of Cambridge City and South Cambridgeshire, where most work has taken place.
# ‘kilometres saved in current year’ is derived by assuming that each driver was previously driving for 240 working days and making a daily round trip of
29.6kms. This is the average distance of a commuter journey by car, according to the 2001 ‘Travel to work in GB’ personal travel factsheet produced by the
DfT and ONS.
* Reflects frequency of contact between employers and Birmingham city council, rather than quality of travel plan.26
Table 5: Indicative public sector costs of smarter choice measures, in pence/vehicle
kilometre reduced
Measure Source Indicative cost*
pence/vehicle km reduced
Workplace travel plans-- Birmingham case study 0.1 – 0.3
Bristol case study 0.6 – 1.6
Buckinghamshire case study 0.7 – 1.5
Cambridgeshire case study 0.4 – 0.9
Merseyside case study 0.4 – 0.7
Nottingham case study 0.6 – 2.0
York case study 0.4 – 0.6
School travel plans Buckinghamshire case study 1.4 – 2.6
Merseyside case study 2.0 – 3.8
York case study 5.3 – 9.9¬
Personalised travel
planning
Gloucester case study (pilot) 3.3
Bristol case study (Vivaldi phase 1) 3.4
London proposed large-scale 1.2




Brighton case study 4.4
Nottingham case study 4.1
Travel awareness York case study 0.2 – 2.7
Car clubs# Edinburgh case study 4.8
Bristol case study 5.1
Car-sharing Buckinghamshire case study 3.3
Milton Keynes case study 0.7
Teleworking In all three cases, private sector investment is needed, but cost
savings should outweigh investment costs. However, public sector
intervention may be needed to stimulate developments and
changes in business practice^.
Tele-conferencing
Home shopping
* Use of decimal places (eg in 0.2p) should not be read as greater precision than 1p, 5p etc.. Capital costs
have been annualised at 3.5%. No allowance has been made for induced traffic.
-- Excludes spending by the private sector. It is probable that private employers will only invest in travel plans
if they see offsetting benefits, such as reduced parking requirements, improved staff recruitment and
retention, obtaining commercially valuable planning permissions, etc. In some cases, employers have
managed entirely to fund travel plans from car parking charges.
¬ York’s school travel cost figures were high because they included a substantial amount of safer routes work,
as well as the ‘softer’ elements of school travel plans. Such engineering work is often essential to school
travel plans, but, in many authorities, it is partly borne by the road safety budget, not simply by the school
travel plans budget.
+Costs include public investment only. Investment by commercial operators is assumed to be motivated, and
therefore at least offset, by revenue generated by additional passengers. (Net costs would be even less where
revenue from additional passengers exceeds investment by the operator).
# It is likely that car clubs will become cheaper, and eventually ‘free’, at the point when they become self-
financing.
^ For telework, we estimated that the British Telecom (BT) initiative had reduced travel at a cost of 1.2 pence
per km, in terms of the costs to BT of facilitating teleworking. However, this calculation did not include
offsetting savings. For example, BT estimated that telework has contributed to their office space savings worth
£180 million per year.
For teleconferencing, one company reported that videoconferencing equipment paid for itself within the first
week of each month in terms of reduced travel costs and staff time savings, and numerous other companies
also reported financial savings from adopting teleconferencing. However, public sector promotion, advice and
grants may be needed to encourage greater adoption of teleconferencing as mainstream practice, which are
currently impossible to cost.27
For home shopping, provision of services is largely occurring for commercial reasons anyway. However,
public sector promotion of home shopping for groceries could help to increase take-up, and funding for local
drop-off facilities could help to make freight operations more efficient.
Table 6: Summary of impacts of different types of soft measure
Journey purpose Soft measure
Impact*~
Non-urban Urban
Low High Low High
Journey to work Workplace travel plans 2% 4% 5% 9%
Car sharing 0..6% 11% 0.6% 11%
Teleworking 3% 12% 3% 12%
Combined impact of workplace travel plans, car
sharing and teleworking, allowing for double counting
5% 24% 8% 26%
Journey to school School travel plans 4% 20% 4% 20%
Business journeys Tele-conferencing 2.5% 18% 2.5% 18%
Shopping trips Home shopping for
groceries
1% 4% 1% 4%





<1% <1% 1% 3%
Public transport information
and marketing
0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 1.1%
Travel awareness
campaigns
0.1% 1% 0.1% 1%




~ Note that for soft factors which affect multiple journey purposes, the impact is expressed relative to all car
travel. For soft factors which affect only one journey purpose, it is expressed relative to car travel for that
purpose.
* Impact is expressed as a percentage reduction in car kilometres for the relevant journey purposes for car
clubs, car sharing, home shopping for groceries and local collection points. For all other measures, the impact
is expressed as a percentage reduction in car trips for the relevant journey purposes. These figures were also
applied to car kilometres, as there was no information from either the literature or the case studies that would
enable the reliable calculation of different figures for kilometres.
Table 7: Impacts of soft factors on future traffic levels




National traffic 2% 11%
Peak-time national traffic 4% 17%
Off-peak national traffic 2% 10%
Urban traffic 3% 14%
Peak-time urban traffic 5% 21%
Off-peak urban traffic 3% 13%
Non-urban traffic 2% 8%
Peak-time non-urban traffic 3% 14%
Off-peak non-urban traffic 1% 7%